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Abstract: Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to 
emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates 
with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection 
with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within 
emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-
propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content 
of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual 
experience and correctness conditions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretation of 




Propositionalism is often characterized as the view that all intentional attitudes, like 
belief, hope, and desire, are relations to propositions. As such, the class of intentional 
attitudes would be exhausted by the class of propositional attitudes.1 Whatever the status 
of that view, given its ostensible commitment to a relational view of intentionality and 
the metaphysical reality of the propositions to which a subject is related, there is a view 
in the vicinity we can call propositionalism about content. According to this less demanding 
view, the intentional content characteristic of the relevant intentional states has a 
propositional structure and therefore intentional states should be characterized as having 
propositional content. For propositionalism about content to be true, all intentional 
content should be propositional content.2  
Non-propositionalism about content can be framed as a denial of the 
aforementioned view: some intentional states have a content which does not have a 
propositional structure – intentional content is not ipso facto propositional content. There 
is a further requirement to specify what non-propositional content amounts to (i.e. what 
its structure is, if not propositional). Perhaps the relevant intentional states have purely 
                                                
1 See Perry 1994 387-8; Stoljar 1996: 191. 
2 See Searle 1983; 2018: 259-71; Sinhababu 2015: 1-16. 
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objectual content, and so are objectual rather than propositional attitudes.3 Alternatively, 
perhaps the relevant intentional states are directed towards unbound properties which 
don’t qualify any object, and so have purely property content.4 
Theorists arguing for non-propositional content often appeal to emotions.5 While 
there may be examples of propositional emotions, for example, ‘fearing that the stock 
market will crash’, there are arguably a range of non-propositional emotions. Examples 
often take objectual form, for example, ‘Bill fears snakes’ or ‘Bill loves Sally’. If there are 
emotions with non-propositional content, then propositionalism about content is false – 
the content of some intentional states is non-propositional. Contrastingly, if the emotions 
in question have propositional content, then one evidence base for non-propositionalism 
is removed.  
Given the significance of either conclusion, it is surprising that discussion of 
emotions within the context of debates surrounding (non)propositional content have 
proceeded without detailed engagement with developments in contemporary theory of 
emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional 
experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory one finds claims that emotional 
experiences per se are (i) non-propositional attitudes, (ii) have non-propositional content 
or (iii) exhibit a kind of non-propositional intentionality, without detailed argument, or 
consideration of what such claims entail.6  
This paper remedies this by clarifying the content of emotional experience within the 
context of debates surrounding (non)propositional content. There are arguments for 
taking emotional experiences as the primary object of inquiry when it comes to 
                                                
3 For defenders of non-propositional content along objectual lines see Crane 2007; 2009: 452-469; 
Montague 2007: 503-18; Grzankowski 2016a: 314-28; 2016b: 819-39; 2018: 134-151; forthcoming. The term 
objectual attitude comes from Forbes 2002: 141-183. 
4 See Mark Johnston’s (2004: 113-83) discussion of ‘brain grey’, the supposed visual experience a subject 
has when they have their eyes closed, for an example of an intentional experience of an unbounded colour 
property. Alternatively, Angela Mendelovici (2013: 135–157) argues for a similar view of moods, which on 
her view lack particular objects but are nonetheless directed towards putatively ‘unbound’ affective 
properties.  
5 See Montague 2007: 503-18; Crane 2009: 452-469; Grzankowski 2016a: 314-28; 2016b: 819-39.  
6 See Döring 2014: 133; Deonna and Teroni 2012: 78-9; Goldie 2009: 237, 238, fn.1; Tappolet 2000: Ch.6; 
2012: 329; 2016: Ch.1. In emotion psychology see Marcel and Lambie 2002: 239; Frijda 2009: 268. Such 
claims reflect a stronger form of non-propositionalism about emotions, namely that emotions qua emotions 
necessarily have non-propositional content (see section 3 for discussion).  
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philosophical study of the emotions, although I don’t rehearse those here.7 The minimal 
motivation for considering the content of emotional experiences, rather than emotions per 
se, proceeds from there being a question about the structure of their content as experiences.  
The specific aim of this paper is to argue that emotional experiences have 
propositional content, although of a weak kind, associated with aspectual experience and 
correctness conditions. The thesis is provisional because propositionalism about 
emotional content requires that all emotional experiences have propositional content. To 
show this false, non-propositionalism about emotional content needs only one counter-
example. Non-propositionalism can, therefore, accept pluralism about emotional content 
– some being propositional, some non-propositional. Propositionalism about emotional 
content must deny such pluralism, and so has to provide propositional interpretations of 
supposed non-propositional cases. Given this, the aim here is merely to make a prima facie 
case for propositionalism about the content of emotional experiences. 
Let me briefly note further points concerning the motivation for the paper. Someone 
might ask why it is important to argue that emotional experiences have a form of 
propositional content, beyond staking a position, qua emotional experiences, in the 
debate concerning propositionalism vs non-propositionalism. As will become apparent 
in the course of the discussion, in arguing that emotional experiences have a form of 
propositional content we connect to, and provide clarification on, several issues that are 
of significant interest to philosophers of emotion and mind. These are as follows: how 
emotions represent their objects and the structure of their content; the type of mental 
state they are; whether they necessarily include doxastic components; whether the 
emotional experiences we enjoy might be of a piece with affective states of non-human 
animals and human infants; and the kinds of subjective capacities implicated by 
emotional experiences. This topic, therefore, provides fertile ground for tackling some 
of the most important and contested questions concerning emotional experiences.  
The roadmap is as follows. The first section clarifies the ‘weak’ notion of 
propositional content I operate with and clarifies related issues. Section 2 discusses 
emotional intentionality, experiences and reports. Section 3 argues that emotional 
experience is a form of aspectual experience, making the case that its content is 
propositional. Finally, section 4 argues that purely-objectual emotional experiences admit 
of an interpretation which satisfies the weak view of propositional content. 
 
                                                
7 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.1 and Ch.9.   
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1. Initial Clarifications 
1.1 Weak Propositional content 
To say a mental state X is a propositional attitude is to say that we can specify the state 
with three components: a subject-term (S), a transitive attitudinal verb term (V), and a 
complete proposition (<p>), which follows a that-clause. For example, Bill believes that 
<p> is formalized as S V’s that <p>.8 The propositional content here is <p>. As it is 
often glossed, the subject stands in the relevant attitudinal relation to the proposition 
<p>, and as such is correctly ascribed a propositional attitude. However, views on the 
nature of propositional content, and the relation the subject bears to this content, go 
beyond a specification of the correct form of propositional attitude reports. They specify 
what it is for a proposition to figure as the content of an intentional state, and so what 
propositional content amounts to. 
There are various views on what propositional content amounts to, however my 
focus here is on a weak form: 
 
Weak propositional content (WPC): intentional state X has propositional content if S is 
intentionally directed, via the relevant intentional attitude, toward an object (e.g. 
physical particular, person, event, or state of affairs including such things) under a 
specific aspect or mode of presentation. As such, the content is a full state of affairs, 
which sets its correctness or evaluability conditions.9 
 
On this view, the relevant intentional state is directed toward an ‘object’ under specific 
aspects or modes of presentation. For example, the relevant mode of presentation in the 
                                                
8 See King 2014: 6–7; Schiffer 2003: 12–5. 
9 See Sellars 1963: section 16; Searle 1983: 35; 2018: 259-271; Grzankowski 2012: 374-391; 2016a: 314-328; 
forthcoming: 2; Richard 2013: 702-19. Let me briefly note that there are stronger views of propositional 
content. According to one, an intentional state X has propositional content if S stands in an attitudinal 
relation to a full proposition, as an abstract (particular), metaphysically real, mind-independent object (call 
this superstrong propositional content) - see Frege 1984 [1922]: 351-72; Russell 1903; Moore 1899: 176-193. 
Alternatively, an intentional state X has propositional content if S is intentionally related, via the relevant 
intentional attitude, toward a sentence-like mental content ‘in the head’, which takes the form of a full 
proposition (call this strong propositional content) - see Fodor 1975; 1983; Chalmers 1996: 19; Larson 2002. 
Whatever the status of these stronger views as applied to intentional states per se, their prospects as applied 
to paradigmatic emotional experiences is poor – typical emotional experiences are neither relations to 
abstract mind-independent objects nor attitudes towards sentence-like mental contents ‘in the head’. In 
any case, my focus here will be on the applicability of the WPC view to emotional experience.  
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case of ‘S believes that <grass is green> is the attributive ‘green’, as a predicated property. 
The content is the way the object is (re)presented by the relevant intentional state, under 
the relevant aspect or mode of presentation. So understood, the propositional content 
determines the correctness conditions for the intentional state; the belief is correct iff 
grass is green, that is when the proposition <grass is green> is true. The proposition is, 
therefore, the truth-maker, as the full state of affairs, and the conditions under which the 
belief is correct need to be the same as those under which the relevant state of affairs 
obtains, i.e., a fact. Finally, on this view, an intentional state having propositional content 
is equivalent to its having correctness conditions (and its having non-propositional 
content is equivalent to its lacking such conditions).10 
Note, someone might object, isn’t this WPC view uninterestingly weak, such that it 
might be preferable to just talk about representations instead. As we shall in section 3, there 
are distinctive dimensions to this WPC view that go beyond a minimal notion of a 
representational state. Further to this, it should be noted that talk of representations is 
talk about the states themselves, whereas talk of propositional content, and the WPC 
view specifically, concerns the structure of the intentional or representational contents of 
the relevant states. 
 
1.2 Manifest content and specifications 
Let me now emphasize a distinction between the structure of the manifest content of an 
intentional state itself (the object presented, as it is presented to the subject) and the 
structure of a (typically linguistic) specification of that content as given in attitude reports, 
what I call the displayed content.11 Eliding this distinction has consequences when 
determining the structure of intentional content given the following argument: 
 
(P1) Intentional State X has a manifest content – it presents something as being 
someway to the subject.  
(P2) In an attitude report or ascription of X, the content component can be specified 
as what follows a that-clause, as a (sentential) complement to the relevant attitude-
verb. 
                                                
10 See Grzankowski 2016a: 316 and Siegel 2011: 70-76 who draw this connection explicitly. Also, see my 
discussion in section 3 and 4 for more on the connection between propositional content and correctness 
conditions.  
11 See Sainsbury 2018: 23 and Iacona 2003: 325-51 for a similar distinction.  
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(P3) The structure of the surface grammar of specifications of the content of 
intentional states (the displayed content as it figures in reports or attributions) either just 
is, or is a sufficiently reliable guide to, the structure of the manifest content of the 
intentional state in itself. Plainly: a content which can be specified in propositional 
form has in itself a propositional structure. 
(Conclusion) Intentional State X has propositional content. 
 
(P3) makes what I call the specifier’s assumption. One might think such an assumption 
benefits propositionalism of some stripe. However, accepting the specifier’s assumption 
also provides the non-propositionalist with an argument for their view: 
 
(P1): Intentional State X has a manifest content – it presents something as being 
someway to the subject.  
(P2*): In an attitude report or ascription of X, the content component cannot be 
specified as what follows a that-clause, as a (sentential) complement to the relevant 
attitude-verb. 
(P3*): The structure of the surface grammar of specifications of the content of 
intentional states (the displayed content as it figures in reports or ascriptions) either 
just is, or is a sufficiently reliable guide to, the structure of the manifest content of the 
intentional state in itself. Simply: a content which can be specified in non-propositional 
form has in itself a non-propositional structure. 
(Conclusion*): Intentional state X has non-propositional content. 
 
So, the non-propositionalist needs specifications of intentional states, as given in attitude 
reports and ascriptions, that resist being displayed propositionally. This could involve 
showing that fully explicated propositional reconstructions of purported objectual 
attitudes either fail or presuppose more primitive attitudes that are irreducibly objectual.12  
Is there reason to accept the specifier’s assumption? In the case of the traditional 
propositional attitudes (e.g. belief, desire) arguably there is. Consider a moment of 
memory loss, where I can’t remember the capital of France. I then have a ‘eureka' 
moment and report or otherwise express (say in speech) that Paris is the capital of France. 
                                                
12 See Montague 2007: 503-18 and Grzankowski 2016a: 314-328. Montague (2007: 504) and Grzankowski 
(2016a: 320) make the specifier’s assumption and within this framework provide arguments for irreducible 
objectual attitudes (cf. Sinhababu 2015: 8-1). 
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When I do, there is arguably a proposition which structures the manifest content of my 
thought, which I am expressing or otherwise displaying, namely that <Paris is the capital 
of France>. In such cases, the structure of the surface grammar of a specification – the 
displayed content – plausibly mirrors the structure of the manifest content of the state in 
itself. Further to this, in the case of conscious thought, explicit assent to a thought-content 
and a specification of its content (or otherwise reporting it) often aren’t different things. 
My specifying the content of my thought can be one way of assenting to it such that they 
coincide. So, one reason we can ‘read off’ the structure of the manifest content of an 
intentional state from the surface grammatical structure of specifications of that content 
(the displayed content) is because for traditional propositional attitudes displaying the 
content can be a way that content is made manifest. 
Whether the above considerations ultimately justify the specifier’s assumption for the 
traditional propositional attitudes is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to note 
that it is more problematic for non-doxastic (i.e. not necessarily belief or judgement 
involving) intentional experiences. Consider that a non-doxastic visual experience of a 
red ball is one thing, a report or ascription, involving a specification of its content, is 
something of a fundamentally different kind. Specifying the content of my perceptual 
experience, say in a perceptual report, is not and could never be, a way of having the 
perceptual experience. In such cases, the structure of the surface grammar of a 
specification of the content of the intentional state (the displayed content), leaves it open to 
further investigation what the structure of the manifest content of that intentional state itself 
is.  
So, without a further argument for making the specifier’s assumption for all 
intentional states, we can’t simply read off the structure of the manifest content of non-
doxastic intentional experiences from the structure (propositional or otherwise) of 
specifications of their content as displayed. So, if the specifier’s assumption is questionable 
for non-doxastic intentional experience, then both the propositionalist and non-
propositionalist have to go beyond exclusively logico-linguistic considerations to provide 
arguments for their positions. They will have to concern themselves with the experiences 
themselves.13 With these clarifications made I move on to consider emotions.   
 
 
                                                
13 Sinhababu (2015: 14) makes a similar point. 
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2. Emotional Intentionality and Emotional Experiences  
Contemporary emotion theorists regard typical emotions as intentional states, in at least 
the sense that they are directed towards objects, such as physical particulars, persons or 
animals, events, and states of affairs. Emotion theorists label these the particular objects 
of emotions, as their target or focus.14 Note though, particular objects should not be 
confused with physical particulars and talk of particular objects does not commit one to 
a positive metaphysical claim. To say the particular object of an episode of fear is a bear 
can be correct, and yet the bear can be imaginary. So, as per standard theory of 
intentionality, emotions can be about non-existents. Furthermore, the notion of a 
particular object should not be taken to entail the idea of specificity, either in terms of 
the emotion necessarily targeting a single thing or something which satisfies a definite 
description. Nonetheless, the idea of a particular object captures the thought that the 
emotion is about something, and so has intentional content.  
So, emotions, on this minimal conception of their intentionality, have intentional 
content and are therefore candidates for having (non)propositional content. If emotions 
were merely non-intentional raw feels they wouldn’t have propositional content, but they 
wouldn’t have non-propositional content either – they simply wouldn’t be contentful 
states. All parties to the debate should, therefore, accept that emotions are intentional 
states, and the minimal conception of their intentionality is a reasonable starting point.  
For the moment, this basic outline of emotional intentionality suffices. I now apply 
the conclusion of the previous subsection to emotions. The result is a distinction between 
the structure of the manifest content of emotional experiences and the structure of the 
displayed content of reports or ascriptions thereof. However, before this, let me lay out the 
dialectical landscape. 
If we hold the specifier’s assumption under suspicion then, we need to distinguish 
theses about the structure of the manifest content of intentional states from theses about 
the structure of the displayed content as it figures in sentences which attribute them. 
Given our interest in the content of emotional experience, we get two views: 
 
(a) The uninteresting propositional view: all emotion reports take propositional form 
and therefore such reports have propositional content. 
(b) The interesting propositional view: all emotional experiences have propositional 
content. 
                                                
14 See Lyons 1980: 104-6; de Sousa 1987: 116; Teroni 2007: 395-415.  
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(a) is a trivial view, and unless we make the specifier’s assumption there is no route from 
(a) to (b). This cuts both ways, and we end up with the same distinction concerning non-
propositionalism about emotions: 
 
(c) The uninteresting non-propositional view: emotion reports sometimes have non-
propositional form and so such reports sometimes have non-propositional 
content. 
(d) The interesting non-propositional view: emotional experiences sometimes have 
non-propositional content. 
 
Again, unless we make the specifier’s assumption, there is no route from (c) to (d). I take 
it that (b) and (d) are the ‘interesting’ views. From here on, I consider the question: ‘do 
emotional experiences have exclusively propositional content?’. Answering this question 
in the affirmative gives us (b), in the negative (d). To get a sense for what motivates either 
answer, we need a firmer grasp on what emotional experiences are. So, I now say 
something about emotion reports and emotional experiences. 
Emotion reports come in various kinds and a range of first and third-person forms. 
At the discursive end, we have emotion diaries consisting of first-person descriptive 
accounts. Similarly, consider the written or verbally communicated emotion reports given 
in empirical psychological experiments.15 More simply, emotion reports can consist in 
one-off exclamations like ‘that was scary’. Finally, introspecting one’s emotion is a kind 
of ‘inner’ emotion report. Introspection roughly consists in a higher-order cognitive-
intentional state which takes the first-order intentional experience as its object, moving 
from experiential awareness of, to conceptually articulated knowledge that.16 Introspective 
reports cannot occur in the third-person; I cannot introspectively report on someone 
else’s emotions. Yet we often report in the third-person that ‘Bill was overcome with 
fear’, or ‘Bill was pining after Sally’.  
The above reports are usually of occurrent, episodic, emotional experiences, as first-
person states of phenomenal awareness that have a what-it-is-likeness, or phenomenal 
character. As it is often put, there is something it is like to be the subject of episodic fear, 
shame, regret, admiration etc., and the reports above are (often) reports of these 
                                                
15 See Davitz 1969. 
16 See Dretske 1997: 39-65. 
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phenomenal states. The precise nature of emotional phenomenology is a complex issue, 
especially accounting for how it relates to the intentionality of emotional experience.17 
For present purposes, it suffices to note that as the subject of object-directed sadness, 
for example, one typically experiences – in addition to a manifest particular object 
– somatic sensations (e.g., a lump in the throat) and a range of other phenomenal 
components and affective qualities. In any case, emotional experiences are intentional 
conscious states with a felt phenomenology and as such, they are occurrent states enjoyed 
by individuals at particular times.18 
If the reports considered above are reports of emotional experiences (they are ways 
of putting those experiences on display), then clearly, they are not identical with the first-
order experiences themselves. This is borne out by the fact that I need not have, and 
typically won’t have, any of the aforementioned phenomenology when reporting the 
emotion.19  
Now consider a different kind of emotion report, which can also be framed in the 
first and third-person. In conversation, I am asked ‘which animals are you afraid of’? I 
respond ‘I’m afraid of snakes’. We don’t usually take such reports to be of occurrent 
emotional experiences. No snake need have been recently present, and I need not 
imagine a snake, so precipitating an emotional response. Instead, I’m reporting an 
emotional disposition, the actualization of which is an emotional experience with snakes 
as the particular object. I’m saying something like: I have a liability to respond with fear 
when snakes are (or seem to be) present, such that if there was a snake in front of me 
now I’d be afraid (given the satisfaction of the relevant background conditions). Now, 
consider a third-person report of a similar kind; a psychologist writing up his notes 
documents that ‘Bill is pathologically afraid of snakes’. Again, it is implausible that this 
reports an occurrent emotional episode. Instead, what it documents an emotional 
disposition. 
More can be said about the nature and origins of emotional dispositions, and their 
relation to emotional experiences.20 Although if they are construed as mental states with 
intentional contents, then there is a question about whether the structure of their content 
                                                
17 See [Redacted] for an account of this connection.  
18 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.1; Goldie 2002: Ch.2; Montague 2009: 171-92. 
19 Emotion reports should be distinguished from emotional expressions (e.g. facial expressions, action-
ready bodily stances; see Frijda 1987: Ch.2). 
20 See Deonna and Teroni 2009 for an overview.	 
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is (non)propositional.21 Whatever we say about these issues, however, it has no direct 
bearing on our question of whether emotional experience has (exclusively) propositional 
content. 
These distinctions between (i) occurrent experiences and reports of them, (ii) 
occurrent experiences and dispositions, and (iii) dispositions and reports of them, may 
seem uncontroversial. However, formulations of propositionalism and non-
propositionalism about emotional content don’t keep them in check. For example, if the 
favoured examples of third-person reports of ‘Bill fears Snakes’ or ‘Bill loves Sally’ are 
the candidate objectual emotions with non-propositional content, we need to know 
whether the relevantly structured content is that of a disposition or an experience.22 If it 
is the former, then we have not answered whether emotional experiences have exclusively 
propositional content. If it is the latter, then we need a further reason why the structure 
of the surface grammar of the intentional content as it figures in these reports (the 
displayed content as putatively purely-objectual in form) is a reliable guide to the structure 
of the manifest content of the experience – i.e. the specifier’s assumption. If that assumption 
cannot be justified, we need further arguments for construing such cases as non-
propositional. Section 4 considers such purely-objectual emotions. Before that, I present 
the case for applying the weaker view of propositional content to emotional experiences.  
 
3. Emotional Experience and the WPC view 
3.1 Three intuitions  
Here are three intuitions an emotion theorist might have which could lead them to claim 
that emotional experience qua emotional experience cannot have propositional content. 
 
Anti-doxastic intuition: The best sense that can be made of the claim that emotional 
experiences have propositional content is that they essentially involve the traditional 
                                                
21 There is the germ of a distinctive idea here, namely that the content of emotional dispositions is 
significantly different from that of emotional experiences. Unfortunately, for reasons of space, I won't 
pursue this issue here, although I take it as more plausible that emotional dispositions could be purely 
objectual (see fn.24). 
22 See Crane 2007; 2009: 452-469; Montague 2007: 503-18; Grzankowski 2016a: 314-28; 2016b: 819-39; 
2018: 134-151; forthcoming. These authors are not sufficiently attuned to these distinctions (cf. Grzankowski 
2012: 18-22 who is explicit that he is discussing dispositional fear in the absence of an occurrent experience 
of fear, and provides an objectual attitude account). Some propositionalist accounts of emotions are also 
not sensitive to these distinctions (see, for example, Searle 1983; 2018: 259-271; Sinhababu 2015: 13-4).  
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propositional attitudes (e.g. belief, judgement, desire).23 But it is implausible that 
emotional experiences essentially involve (at least) beliefs or judgements. Emotional 
experiences are non-doxastic. So, the best way of resisting doxasticism about emotional 
experience is by rejecting propositionalism about emotional content. 
 
Anti-conceptual intuition: If emotions have propositional contents, they will involve 
conceptual capacities. It is doubtful that human infants and non-human animals 
would meet the possession conditions for the concepts which would figure in the 
relevant propositional content, and yet they enjoy emotional experiences. So, it is 
best to deny that emotions have propositional content.24 
 
Anti-descriptive intuition: If emotions have propositional contents, they will be 
sentence-like descriptions. Having an emotional experience would be like reading 
the newspaper and this is phenomenologically incorrect. So, it is best to deny that 
emotions have propositional content. 
 
All three intuitions get something right. They track the thought that an account of 
emotional content is implausible if it makes emotional experiences necessarily doxastic, 
(in some sense) conceptual, sentence-like states. They all resist the over-intellectualising 
of emotional experience. 
However, they all depend on too demanding a conception of propositional content, 
and the related mental states and (conceptual) capacities this implicates, or so I argue. 
The goal of this section is to show that, on a WPC view, we can respect what is correct 
about these intuitions, while maintaining that emotional content is propositional. Before 
showing how, let me emphasize one point. If all that is meant by saying that emotional 
experiences exhibit non-propositional intentionality or are (or involve) non-propositional 
attitudes, is that they don’t necessarily involve the familiar propositional attitudes (e.g. 
belief and desire), then the propositionalist about emotional content can agree, but can 
adopt a view that doesn’t have this commitment (e.g. the WPC view considered 
presently). 
 
                                                
23 The belief-desire model of emotion is found in Searle 1983; 2018: 259-271; Gordon 1987; Marks 1982. 
For a range of reasons this view is out of favour (see Deonna and Teroni 2012: ch:3 for a critical overview; 
see also Goldie 2002: 72-83 and Montague 2009: 171-92) 
24 See Deigh 1994: 824–854. 
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3.2 A WPC view of emotional content 
On the WPC view, an emotional experience would have propositional content just in case 
it was intentionally directed toward a particular object under a specific aspect or mode or 
presentation, where the content of the experience is a full state of affairs which sets its 
correctness conditions.  
Connecting to views in emotion theory, it is now common-place to claim that 
emotional experiences have correctness conditions set by their intentional content.25 So 
the WPC view is off to a good start. However, we need to know more about the aspectual 
dimension, which provides the relevant full state of affairs. On one view – the evaluative 
content view – the aspects under which the particular objects of emotional experiences 
are represented are thick evaluative properties, such as the fearsome, disgusting, admirable, 
beautiful, and funny. For example, in an emotional experience of fear, my fear represents 
Bill as fearsome; in admiration, my admiration represents my friend’s actions as admirable. 
Connecting to the point about correctness conditions, my occurrent fear of Bill is said to 
be correct iff Bill really is fearsome. Analogously, my occurrent admiration of a friend’s 
actions will be correct iff their actions really are admirable. So, the conditions under which 
the emotional experience is correct are the same as those under which the relevant 
propositional content obtains (e.g. Bill really is fearsome; my friend’s actions really are 
admirable). More can be said about the evaluative content view, but this outline suffices 
here.26  
It is also worth noting a different view. There are theorists who for various reasons 
resist specifying the manifest content of emotional experience in terms of particular 
objects represented as having (apparent) evaluative properties. Instead, it is claimed that 
emotional experiences represent their objects under evaluatively-relevant, non-evaluative 
properties. For example, in an occurrent episode of fear about an Alsatian, my fear would 
be directed toward the Alsatian under evaluatively-relevant aspects, such as its loud bark, 
sharp teeth, and impulsive behaviour.27 
                                                
25 See Tappolet 2016: Ch.1; Deonna and Teroni 2012: 6-7, 77-79. Deonna and Terori (2012: 79) claim that 
‘emotions are often not directed at propositions’ but always have correctness conditions. As far as I can 
tell, they are concerned to deny what in fn.9 I called the superstrong and strong views of propositional content 
as applied to emotional experiences. I take it that they don’t intend to claim that emotions, at least in 
paradigmatic cases, are solely directed at their objects under no aspects or modes of presentation.  
26 See Tappolet 2016: Ch.1; Johnston 2001: 181-214; Poellner 2016: 1-28; Montague 2009: 171-92 for 
further discussion. 
27 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.7. 
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Whichever view we take, the manifest content of emotional experience involves 
aspects or modes of presentation; the particular objects of emotional experiences are 
represented as possessing evaluative or evaluatively-relevant properties. Such 
experiences, therefore, represent full states of evaluative (or evaluatively-relevant) affairs, which 
set their correctness conditions. Prima facie then, emotional experience has propositional 
content on the WPC view insofar as it is a form of aspectual experience. For ease of 
expression, I talk of evaluative properties from here on in, but the discussion could be 
rephrased in terms of non-evaluative, evaluatively-relevant properties.  
 
3.3 An argument against a WPC view 
I now present an argument against the view under consideration which brings into focus 
two of the intuitions which we started this section with:  
 
(P1) Emotional experience is a form of aspectual experience. 
(P2) Insofar as (P1) is true, emotional experience has propositional content on the 
WPC view. 
(P3) The best model for aspectual experience is ‘seeing as’ (or something analogous 
to it), and this requires (a) a cognitive act of predication, and (b) the application of 
the relevant concept in that predicative act.  
(P4) Concerning (a), the model of ‘seeing as’ motivates parsing emotional experience 
as follows: (i) a non-emotional experience (e.g. a perception, imagination etc.) of the 
particular object and (ii) an emotional thought of the kind (X is E) – as a conscious 
act of evaluative predication. So, emotional experience is essentially thought 
involving.   
(P5) Concerning (b), a condition of having the relevant aspectual emotional 
experience is having the relevant concepts, given conscious acts of predication 
require the subject to possess the concepts which figure in that predicative content. 
(P6) However, if either (P4) or (P5) are correct regarding emotional experience, then 
we run afoul of the anti-doxastic and/or anti-conceptual intuitions. 
(Conclusion) Given we respect these intuitions, emotional experience does not have 
propositional content, even on a WPC view. 
 
This argument represents a challenge to the WPC view. The following discussion 
considers how the view can respond. 
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We can begin by arguing that (P3) operates with too demanding a conception of 
aspectual experience. Let me first consider how such a response plays out concerning 
(P4) – I come back to (P5) below.  
The relevant model of aspectual experience need not be ‘seeing as’, if that necessarily 
parses aspectual experience into two components; namely, the ‘simple seeing’ of X and 
then a predicative thought ‘X is F’. Instead, the relevant model can be analogous to that 
of a perceptual experience of objects with phenomenal properties. One has a visual 
experience, for example, of a ‘table as brown’. But there is no suggestion that one typically 
enjoys a perceptual experience of a bare particular, the table as such, and then predicates 
it as brown in conscious thought deploying the concept ‘brown’. The specification of the 
content in the terms ‘table as brown’, might (wrongly) give that impression. But what one 
perceptually experiences – the manifest content – is a brown table. So, it is not evident that 
aspectual experience necessarily involves a thought with predicative content.28 So, the 
relevant model of aspectual experience is not necessarily one which implicates thoughts, 
although it may involve the deployment of specific conceptual (re)identificatory 
capacities (as we shall see, this caveat creates further problems for the WPC view).   
In the emotional case, the same move can be made. By understanding emotional 
experience as a type of aspectual experience, we need not commit to saying that it 
involves two components; namely, an experience (perceptual, imaginative etc.) of the 
particular object, and an emotional thought which predicates it as having the relevant 
evaluative property. There is no suggestion that, in fear, for example, one sees the dog 
and then predicates it in emotional thought as dangerous. The specification of the content 
in the terms ‘dog as dangerous’ might give that impression but the relevant emotional 
experience just presents the dangerous dog, the beautiful painting, the admirable individual.29 As 
in the sense-perceptual case, these experiences, are not necessarily thought-involving, 
although they might involve the deployment of specific evaluative conceptual 
(re)identificatory capacities. For this move to be blocked, we would need a convincing 
argument showing that aspectual experience in the emotional case necessarily requires 
                                                
28 Even conceptualists like McDowell no longer claim this in the perceptual case (see his 2013: 144-57). 
29 We need a further account of how it does so – that is the kind of non-doxastic representational states 
that emotional experiences are, i.e., whether they are perceptual experiences, quasi-perceptual experiences, 
sui generis intentional experiences, sui generis bodily attitudes. This is a complicated question that cannot be 
dealt with here. For my thoughts on these issues see [Redacted]; see also Deonna and Teroni 2015: 293-
311, and Rossi and Tappolet 2018: 113-83. 
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being parsed into two personal level mental states, one of which is a predicative thought. 
To my knowledge, no such argument exists. 
However, the critic might respond by homing in on the reference to conceptual 
capacities. (P5) claims that if the emotional experience involves conscious acts of 
predication (P4 being true), then a condition on the relevant aspectual experience is that 
the subject possesses the relevant concepts (e.g. dangerous, fearsome, beautiful). We have just 
argued that (P4) can be resisted by rejecting (P3): the relevant model for aspectual 
experience need not be an understanding of ‘seeing as’ as involving two components, 
one of which is a predicative thought. So, ostensibly we are not drawn to (P5) either. Yet, 
if aspectual experience necessarily involves conceptual (re)identificatory capacities, and 
the best model for understanding how such capacities figure at the personal level is along 
the lines of concepts of properties (perhaps understood along Fregean lines as 
inferentially relevant constituents of contents) being deployed in acts of active 
predication, then we are forced back to (P4). So, the critic might insist we still run afoul 
of the anti-doxastic and anti-conceptual intuitions. 
Given this roundabout way of blocking the appeal to a less demanding notion of 
aspectual experience, the defender of the WPC view of emotional content needs to 
further clarify the relevant conceptual constraint on aspectual experience to avoid being 
pushed back into positing conscious acts of active predication. In the next sub-section, I 
suggest that they can do so by distinguishing between different kinds of conceptual 
capacities. 
Before that, consider the following alternative. Perhaps the best way to respond is to 
claim that the relevant aspectual experience is non-conceptual, and so give up any conceptual 
constraint. However, appeals to non-conceptual content are contentious. If all this signals 
is the distinction between the manifest content of experience and the (usually) 
symbolically mediated, discursive content of the traditional (doxastic) propositional 
attitudes (e.g. judgment and belief),30 then emotional content (on a WPC view) may turn 
out to be non-conceptual in this uncontroversial sense. However, we have not progressed 
in the argument. Under pressure from the critic, we need to show how this distinction 
can be applied in the case of a WPC view of emotional content. Doing this requires more 
than merely stipulating a notion of non-conceptual content which assumes the 
applicability of the distinction in this case.  
                                                
30 This seems the primary motivation Christine Tappolet has in claiming that emotions have non-
conceptual content (see Tappolet 2016: Ch.1). 
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Further to this, conceptualists can agree that there is a phenomenological difference 
between the manifest content of lived experience and the discursive content of 
judgements, in terms of the way properties are represented. For example, consider the 
difference between fine-grained phenomenal-yellow as it figures in a visual experience of 
a particular object as instantiating that colour, and YELLOW, the symbolically mediated 
predicate, as it figures in the judgement ‘O is YELLOW’ (as the inferentially relevant 
constituent of that content). According to some philosophers, it still makes sense to claim 
that the visual experience has conceptual content. This is because the conceptual 
capacities implicated in judgement, involving symbolically mediated predicates, may not 
exhaust the range of conceptual capacities that either are or can be in play in non-doxastic 
experience. What is, therefore required to justify talk of non-conceptual content (in a 
more demanding sense) is an argument to the effect that, for example, phenomenal-
yellow as it figures in a visual experience does not involve the deployment of conceptual 
capacities per se.31 Rather than pursue issues of non-conceptual content, the alternative 
route is to provide an account of aspectual experience which clarifies the relevant 
conceptual constraint, showing how it can be applied to emotional experience without 
running afoul of the relevant intuitions. 
 
3.4 Aspectual experience and passive predication 
Let me first say something about doxastic conceptual sophistication and the kind of 
predication this involves, keeping in mind that what follows is intended as a rough 
characterization.32 Doxastic conceptual sophistication is (or involves) the ability to 
actively predicate properties of objects in acts of (more or less) explicit conscious 
judgement or thought by the use of concepts (perhaps along with other relevant 
concepts, e.g. indexicals). The relevant concepts are general concepts in the sense that they 
meet Gareth Evans’ Generality Constraint in the following way: for a subject to meet the 
possession conditions for a general concept they must have the ability to re-combine the 
candidate concept in an indefinite range of linguistically specifiable propositions which 
                                                
31 See McDowell 1994 (cf. Peacocke 2001: 239-64). 
32 A full account of the nature of predicative thought and its conceptual structure would require a separate 
paper. Note that the kind of conceptual sophistication outlined might involve mere entertaining, and so not 
explicit assent in the form of judgement. In such cases, we might talk of quasi-doxastic conceptual 
sophistication insofar as the mode of entertaining does not involve a commitment to the relevant content 
as in paradigmatic doxastic attitudes.   
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they would understand. For example, if I possess the concept ‘fearsome’ there should be 
no cognitive barrier to me both entertaining and understanding an indefinite number of 
propositions where ‘fearsome’ figures in the predicate position (e.g. ‘a is fearsome, b is 
fearsome, c is fearsome’), as the inferentially relevant constituent of that content.33 
Tyler Burge makes a similar point. He claims the scope of attributives in 
propositional thought can function outside of what he calls ‘context-bounded 
identificational or other noun-like referential structures’ to which perceptual attributives 
are necessarily limited (i.e., attributives in propositional thought at least have the 
possibility of being applied in a context-independent way).34 So there is a kind of 
conceptual sophistication, the doxastic kind, which involves concepts being deployed in 
conscious acts of predication, as a kind of active predication. Talk of ‘acts of predication’ 
is reminiscent of cognitive realist views, which explain what it is for a proposition to 
figure as the content of an intentional state in terms of cognitive act types.35 
Less demandingly, we might think there are also non-doxastic conceptual capacities, as 
non-thought involving, (re)identificatory capacities. These are the kinds of conceptual 
capacities which some conceptualists claim are passively drawn into operation in 
experience.36 Insofar as we make this distinction between levels of conceptual 
sophistication, then the conceptual capacities drawn into operation in aspectual 
experience, and relatedly the kind of predication this involves, should be different from 
that which is involved in the traditional propositional attitudes, which deploy doxastic 
conceptual capacities (even if the two stand in an important relation; see below). What 
we are homing in on is a kind of passive predication, where intentional experience can be 
described as ‘carving out’ the relevant portion of the environment as being ‘thus and so’ 
(what follows is not a full account of passive predication; here I sketch the phenomenon).  
In different terms, Sydney Shoemaker says, in the perceptual case, ‘if I see something, 
it looks somehow to me’,37 and Fred Dretske writes that ‘in a certain sense, D must look 
                                                
33 Evans 1982: 100-5.  
34 Burge 2010: 40-41. 
35 See Hanks 2015; Soames 2015. If one accepts that emotional experiences are non-doxastic states, then it 
is difficult to see how such a view could be extended to them. The result would be that emotions are 
reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, the tokening of certain kinds of beliefs and judgements, 
along with relevant non-intentional feelings (see, e.g. Brigham 2017: 500).   
36 See McDowell 1994: 22. 
37 Shoemaker 1975: 299. 
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some way to S… in order for S to see D’.38 And finally, as Alex Grzankowski’s puts it, 
‘it’s hard to see what could be more fundamental to representing propositionally that 
representing things as being some way.’39 All these authors are homing in on passive 
predication, where the condition articulated is that insofar as an object is presented in 
experience it must seem, in the phenomenal sense of seems, ‘some way’ or ‘somehow’. 
Note, talk of ‘predication’ remains apt insofar as the aspectual experience, in one non-
literal way of putting it, says that something is a certain way. Indeed, it must do so on 
pain of not presenting its object under any aspect. But it does so in a way that need be 
no more cognitively demanding than the sense in which a visual perceptual experience 
of a coloured-object, for example, is passively predicative, and so ‘says’ (again in a non-
literal sense) that the table is brown.  
The distinction is also reflected in the phenomenological difference between a 
particular object seeming to be a certain way, and judging that it is a certain way. On the view 
being developed here, both arguably involve conceptual capacities, but the former are 
non-doxastic and the latter doxastic, and this is reflected in the different kinds of 
predication they involve; the former involves the merely passive predication of aspectual 
experience, whereas the latter involves the active predication of conscious thought, 
judgement, and belief.40 Note, the passivity vs activity distinction being employed here is 
not to do with how we come to have the relevant mental states – the majority of our 
beliefs are, indeed, passively acquired. Instead, it has to do with the nature of the 
predication involved in those mental states. Of course, if someone prefers a different 
term than passive predication that is fine, as long as the phenomenological differences, 
and the difference in levels of conceptual sophistication, are kept in mind. 
If we accept these distinctions, then the defender of the WPC view of emotional 
content has the means to block the critic’s route from (i) aspectual experience involving 
some minimal conceptual constraint to (ii) its necessarily involving conscious acts of 
predication. The defender of that view can argue that the minimal conceptual constraint 
on enjoying an aspectual emotional experience is having the relevant evaluative 
                                                
38 Dretske 1969: 9. 
39 See Grzankowski forthcoming: 3. 
40 For a detailed account of the way concepts are applied to objects in predicative thought, see Burge 2009; 
and 2010: 39-67. Note the claim is not that the distinction between active and passive predication is the 
most fundamental distinction and difference between the level of judgement and that of experience, but 
rather that it is one central difference, which I am emphasizing for present purposes.  
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(re)identificatory capacity in play – not deploying the Evans-style general concepts. 
Insofar as this is the case the relevant kind of predication is passive evaluative predication. 
So, emotional experience having propositional content on the WPC view –the experience 
having a ‘something is some evaluative way’ or ‘evaluatively somehow’ content structure 
– is not to be equated with conscious acts of predication and the predicative content of 
judgements or thoughts. The fact that aspectual emotional experience involves minimal 
(re)identificatory conceptual capacities in this sense does not force one to say otherwise, 
once the relevant different senses of conceptual capacities, and the predication this 
involves, are clarified. The relevant conceptual sophistication implicated in aspectual 
emotional experience is therefore of a fundamentally non-doxastic sort, involving passive 
evaluative predication.41 
Note, a stronger form of conceptualism about experience might claim that passive 
re-identification being rightly labelled conceptual is dependent on active concept-
deployment being available, such that re-identification would necessarily involve a subject 
having the ability to think “this [seen now] is the same as that [seen previously]”, and 
thinking this involves active predication. Passive re-identification would have to be poised 
to feed into the relevant recognitional judgements. 
However, even if one were to accept this condition, this concedes the point at issue 
since we are dealing with two strongly related but distinct capacities or abilities, and we 
should not conflate the capacities themselves with what they enable. First, there is the 
experientially-grounded, phenomenologically salient capacity to ‘recognize as the same’ 
or ‘recognize X as being some way’, and then there is the separate, but arguably importantly 
related, ability to deploy such a ‘carving out as the same’ in thought. On this issue, one 
might argue that the constraint should be that the latter (doxastic) ability is only possible 
when one has the former (non-doxastic) ability, but that the latter need not be possessed, 
or perhaps more concessively, need not be in any given instance exercised, in order to 
have the former (it is, after all, an ability).42  
                                                
41 Note, social constructionists in the neuroscience of emotion (see Russell and Barrett 2014 for an 
overview) often claim that some form of concept-possession is necessary for emotion. However, I take it 
that the kinds of concepts these authors discuss are closer to the Evans-style general concepts, as 
inferentially relevant general terms, than those minimal conceptual (re)identificatory capacities. I take it to be 
implausible, as the discussion suggests, that such general terms in any sense show up in emotional experience. 
Although this marks an interesting point of contact which warrants further discussion. 
42 Of course, one might hasten to the call the non-doxastic ability itself a recognitional capacity, preferring 
to maintain that what is sufficient for recognition is the non-doxastic ability combined with the ability to 
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However, even if the more demanding conceptualist claim is correct, we might adopt 
a less demanding notion of re-identification in the context of propositional content for 
certain cases. We could perhaps move to a notion of responding in the same way to different 
instances (which might motivate talk of non-conceptual propositional content in this specific 
sense) without any need to possess an ability to take up the relevant content in thought. 
These are complex issues about which more needs to be said, however, if the distinction 
between doxastic and non-doxastic conceptual capacities, and the types of predication 
involved, stands, that suffices for my purposes here.   
Let me now take stock by returning to the intuitions. Given the above account, we 
can respect what is right about the anti-doxastic intuition in a way that does not undermine 
the WPC view of emotional content. We have also provided the means to see how the 
view can agree with part of the anti-conceptual intuition, which claims it is doubtful that 
human infants and (non-linguistic) non-human animals would meet the possession 
conditions for what are now understood as the Evans-style general concepts (those 
inferentially relevant constituents which would figure in the relevant propositional 
content). There is no overriding reason to think that in the relevant contexts, the minimal 
(re)identificatory capacities are to be identified with the deployment of any such general 
concept in the active predication of thought. Moreover, there is no reason to deny that 
creatures other than adult humans can possess such minimal (re)identificatory capacities 
(or something sufficiently similar to them).43 On this view, an animal can be afraid, and 
its fear can represent the relevant particular object as fearsome – as evaluatively ‘some way’. 
As such, the animal’s emotional experience can ‘carve-out' the relevant portion of the 
environment as being evaluatively ‘thus and so’, and so have propositional content on a 
WPC view. Yet it can do so without the animal possessing the doxastic conceptual 
sophistication to express this in conscious acts of predication, paradigmatically involving 
linguistic or symbolically mediated capacities. As Burge notes, we should avoid a simple 
conflation of propositional structure with linguistic structure, even if the latter is the most 
                                                
judge that X is F at different times. However, this mainly seems an issue concerning how we use the term 
recognition, rather than a substantive point concerning the nature of, and distinctions between, the 
capacities and abilities involved.  
43 A different way of meeting that intuition would be to deny that the affective experiences of animals can 
have propositional contents even in the WPC sense; one might say that they have ‘mere affects', but these 
are different from emotions. 
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‘impressive expression of propositional structure’.44 Finally, the idea of passive 
predication gives the lie to the anti-descriptive intuition. Insofar as active predication (in 
experience) involves descriptively ‘reading off’ features of the world, then insofar as 
aspectual emotional experience only involves passive predication, then it doesn’t involve 
this.  So, on the preceding analysis, the WPC view of emotional content can respect what 
is right about the intuitions, while maintaining that such content is a kind of propositional 
content.  
 
4. Purely Objectual Emotional Experiences 
Defenders of non-propositionalism about emotional content need examples of 
emotional experiences which fail to satisfy the WPC view. Given this, they have two 
routes, expressed in the following theses: 
 
Objectual thesis (OT): There are emotional experiences that are directed toward 
(particular) objects, but not under aspects or modes of presentation (hereafter 
purely-objectual emotions). 
 
Property thesis (PT): There are emotional experiences that are directed toward 
unbound properties, which do not qualify any particular object (hereafter purely-
property emotions). 
 
In answer to the question ‘do emotional experiences have exclusively propositional 
content’ the OT, and PT answer in the negative: emotional experiences sometimes have 
non-propositional content. In this final section, I focus on the OT. 
First, though, consider that the PT involves denying the emotions are directed at 
particular objects. Given we accept that emotions have this minimal intentionality, then 
the PT will be a non-starter. Further, it is difficult to formulate examples of purely-
property emotions. So even if there are unbound properties, which figure as the content 
of some intentional states,45 it is difficult to see how emotional experiences could admit 
of this characterization.  
                                                
44 See Burge 2010:52. Although Burge develops a notion of propositional representational content that is 
significantly more complex than the WPC view, which seems closer to the strong propositional content view 
mentioned in 1.2.  
45 See fn.4. 
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4.1 The objectual thesis  
Arguably one kind of emotional experience which supports the OT are those singularly 
directed at persons. We should understand persons in the everyday sense, as referring to 
individuals to whom both physical and mental predicates apply in our judgements. The 
candidate example of a purely-objectual emotion can be formulated as ‘Bill loves Sally’.46 
However, as we saw in previous sections, this is ambiguous since it can be interpreted as 
reporting a disposition. Love and hate construed dispositionally, or as non-occurrent 
emotional attitudes, may be (irreducibly) objectual attitudes. However, my concern is 
whether emotional experiences have a content which is propositional, on a WPC view. So, 
to be a candidate example for the OT, we need to formulate it as follows:  
 
OT candidate emotion: an occurrent experience of love for O (assuming that there are 
such experiences).47  
 
The defender of the OT needs it to be true that my emotional experience does not 
represent O under any aspect or mode of presentation – there need be no passive 
predication – but rather is singularly directed upon its object, having ‘nothing to say’ 
about its properties.48 
The following reasoning supports this view. In the case of aspectual emotional 
experience, it makes sense to talk about correctness conditions. We can assess whether 
fear, for example, ‘gets it right’, because it represents its object as being a particular 
evaluative way – so providing the full state of evaluative affairs which sets the correctness 
conditions. It is, therefore, a legitimate question whether things are as they are 
represented as being. However, when it comes to an occurrent experience of love, it 
makes no sense to ask whether my love ‘gets things right’ in any epistemic sense. My 
feelings of love for O are not the kind of thing that can be evaluated in this way. As 
Grzankowski puts it, ‘there seems to be no sensible question of the form, ‘when is John’s 
                                                
46 Variations of this example are found in Crane 2007; 2009: 452-469; Montague 2007: 503-18; 
Grzankowski 2016a: 314-28; 2016b: 819-39; 2018: 134-151; forthcoming. 
47 Cf. Lyons 1980: 55, who claims that ‘love’ only has a dispositional usage. See Montague (2007: 511-15) 
for some logico-linguistic arguments in favour of love being an irreducibly objectual attitude in the 
dispositional sense.  
48 As Grzankowski (forthcoming, 2) puts it, ‘if there are mental representations that represent but do not 
represent that thing as being some way, then they fail to have propositional content’. 
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love accurate/satisfied/true’’;49 such epistemic talk is unintelligible in these contexts, and 
this is because this kind of emotional experience has purely-objectual, rather than 
propositional, content.50 Note, in specific contexts, we may say feelings of love are 
prudentially or morally inappropriate.51 However, we are interested in the epistemic sense 
of appropriateness in terms of correctly representing the object as it is. 
Before considering responses from the propositionalist about emotional content in 
the WPC sense (hereafter the propositionalist), note that what follows is not intended to 
be a theory of the experience of love, much less of love in general. Neither myself nor 
the non-propositionalists who use love as an example offer that. Instead, love is used as 
a candidate case, given its putatively purely-objectual character.  
Now, one might claim that there is an evaluative property that feelings of love for O 
represent O as having, namely being loveable. Likewise, feelings of hate for O represent 
O as having the property hateable. The idea is not, however, that Bill has to love Sally in 
virtue of some specific property she has, but rather that an experience of love necessarily 
qualifies its particular object under a ‘loving’ aspect. However, the defender of the OT 
can claim this begs the question. We need more detailed considerations for why we 
should take this view as even prima facie plausible. In what follows, I set out these 
considerations, including responses. Note though, the defender of the OT can concede 
that I may enjoy other (non-loving) representations concerning Sally, and that these have 
a content which is best made sense of in terms of the WPC view. The contention is that 
in the case of the specifically loving representation of Sally that we have a case of a purely-
objectual experience. 
Let’s begin by noting (again) that many emotion theorists claim that emotional 
experiences are essentially evaluative phenomena. How this is cashed out is contentious, 
with competing theories suggesting different accounts.52 One widely-accepted thought, 
however, is that emotional experiences are paradigmatically intelligible in a first-person 
way. The idea, roughly, is that emotional experiences make sense to us, when we have 
them, in virtue of a connection to evaluative properties. This is often phrased as follows: 
it makes sense to be afraid of the fearsome, admiring of the admirable, and so on. These 
                                                
49 See Grzankowski 2016: 318 (see also forthcoming: 3).  
50 Remember Grzankowski (2016a: 316) claims that the key difference between intentional states with 
propositional and non-propositional content is the having or lacking of accuracy conditions.  
51 See Tappolet 2016: Ch.3 for an overview of these different senses of appropriateness. 
52 See fn.31. 
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considerations generate an intelligibility constraint.53 The propositionalist can 
straightforwardly respect this constraint given that emotional experiences as claimed to 
represent their objects under evaluative aspects – my love is intelligible insofar as that 
experience involves a representation of a loveable object (it makes sense in those terms). 
However, it is not clear how the OT can. Remember on the OT, feelings of love for O 
have ‘nothing to say’ about the properties of O.  
Reflecting this problem, consider the following example. We are told that Bill now 
has feelings of hate for Sally – another putative candidate of a purely-objectual emotion. 
He has had a change of heart. Given the OT, however, such a change in emotional 
attitude would not make sense from the first-person perspective in terms of represented 
properties of the object of the experience, or indeed any change thereof, since there were 
none represented to begin with. The change in emotional attitude would, therefore, be 
unintelligible in that sense.  
Failure to meet the intelligibility constraint in this way would be reflected in the fact 
that Bill could not have any reasons available to him from the first-person perspective to 
which he could appeal for his change in attitude – it would be seem like a ‘brute’ 
unintelligible switch. Contrastingly, consider the following reason-based response to the 
following question: ‘why did you stop loving her and start hating her’? Response: ‘because 
she no longer seemed loveable…I came to despise her’. The first-person intelligibility of 
this explanation is premised on two things. Firstly, that the loving emotion originally 
represented the person as loveable (or some related evaluative property). And secondly, 
that the subsequent ‘hating’ emotion represented the person as lacking this property (and 
taking on new ones). In this sense, the reasons we give for having the affectionate feelings 
we do, as reflecting our emotional experiences being intelligible responses in the first-
personal sense, is premised on a reference to evaluative (or evaluatively-relevant) 
properties as properties of the object. Absent such an aspectual dimension, the emotional 
experience ceases to be intelligible in the relevant sense. 
In response, the defender of the OT could jettison the intelligibility constraint so 
framed, claiming purely-objectual emotions need not meet it. But this runs afoul of 
common-sense and phenomenology. Naively our feelings of love and hate make sense 
to us in the first-person. The propositionalist has an explanation of why this is so. 
Contrastingly, the defender of the OT looks to be pushing the counter-intuitive view. 
                                                
53 See Wiggins 1998: 108, 199 Teroni 2007: 395-415; Poellner 2016: 1-28; Goldie 2002: 22-3.  
 26 
The defender of the OT might, however, react as follows. Perhaps certain instances 
of ‘feelings of love’ can be framed in terms of aspectual emotional experience, and in 
such cases, the relevant aspect might be loveable (or adorable, or caring etc.). However, this 
is not plausible for all such experiences and remember, for non-propositionalism about 
emotional content to be true one convincing non-propositional candidate suffices. In 
fact, it over-intellectualizes certain emotional experiences to claim that the subject 
necessarily has to be (phenomenally) aware of specific properties, in virtue of which the 
emotional experience would first-personally make sense, and to which they could appeal 
in reason-giving contexts. Further to this, it is a feature of the kinds of contexts which 
putatively involve purely-objectual emotions, that subjects often say things like ‘I feel like 
I hate her, but I don’t know why’ or ‘I don’t know why I love him, I just feel I do’. What 
such statements indicate is that purely-objectual emotions need not be intelligible as 
framed by the intelligibility constraint. The propositionalist should take seriously these 
kinds of statements as pointing to a genuine phenomenon. What is required is a different 
interpretation, compatible with the view that the content of emotional experience is 
propositional. 
First, note that it is plausible that the thick evaluative properties which figure at the 
level of intentional content in emotional experience, on the WPC view, are higher-level 
properties whose instantiation depends on the presence of specific conjunctions of 
lower-level basal properties, where the relation would be some form of supervenience. 
Evaluative properties like the beautiful, disgusting, and fearsome – and in our case the 
loveable or adorable – are rarely (if ever) instantiated simpliciter, but rather stand in 
supervenience relations to conjunctive co-instantiations of non-evaluative features of the 
relevant particular objects. Nonetheless, this does not mean that in all cases one need be 
consciously aware of all the relevant subtending non-evaluative properties (and their 
conjunctive co-instantiation) on which the evaluative property supervenes to be aware of 
the relevant evaluative property. Naturally, there has to be personal level awareness of 
some lower-level, subtending properties. For example, I cannot be aware of the music’s 
beauty without awareness of the notes being played. Nonetheless, the phenomenology 
of emotional experience suggests that I can be consciously aware of an evaluative 
property, as qualifying a particular object, without a corresponding personal level 
awareness of the specific, complex conjunction of subtending properties on which it is 
resultant in a particular instance.  
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Applying these points to cases of experiential love, which find expression in 
statements like ‘I feel like I love her, but I don’t know why’ we can say the following. In 
such cases, the subject is consciously aware of the (apparent) loveable quality of the 
individual, without being consciously aware of what natural properties prompt this; or, 
more precisely, which non-evaluative properties the value supervenes on. There is, 
therefore, an indeterminacy in such contexts, given the individual is not sure or is ‘blind’ 
as to why the person should seem this loveable way. The subject lacks a theoretical 
understanding of why the object of their experience has the value it seems to have, where 
this amounts to (lacking) knowledge of the relevant non-evaluative properties on which 
the higher-order evaluative property supervenes. Further to this, positing an 
indeterminacy in this way explains the diminished intelligibility. The reason such 
emotional experiences may make less sense than paradigmatic aspectual emotional 
experiences is not that the object fails to be represented under any aspect at all, but 
because the reasons why this object instantiates that value are experientially opaque to 
the subject. So, pace the OT, we are not forced into positing purely-objectual emotional 
experiences in such cases.54  
As a final move, the defender of the OT might circle back to the lack of correctness 
conditions. Given the tight connection between aspectual experience and correctness 
conditions, the propositionalist about emotional content is committed to saying feelings 
of love can be (non)veridical – they can get things (more or less) epistemically right. And 
this places an over-demanding epistemic constraint on such feelings. So, other 
considerations non-withstanding, we still do best to construe such cases as purely-
objectual emotions to avoid epistemic over-demandingness.  
However, the claim that feelings of love can be more or less epistemically right, in a 
way we can to some extent determine, is not as odd as it seems. Certain objects may be 
more or less epistemically appropriate objects of love depending on evaluative (and 
evaluatively-relevant) characteristics they may or may not possess. People often lament 
‘I was such a fool to love him/her’. On one reading, this reflects the way feelings of love 
were representationally sensitive to such features or properties (e.g., loveable, adorable, 
caring, or their evaluatively-related correlates). However, as it turned out, the person did 
                                                
54 Appealing to a generic value content to explain such contexts won't work, since the evaluative content 
needs to individuate the emotion type. But a generic positive value can’t individuate love, such as to 
distinguish it from other kinds of interpersonal favouring. While addressing the topic differently, Montague 
similarly rules out that the content of love may be generic (see Montague 2007: 511). 
 28 
not have these properties or did not have them to the required extent. And to say 
someone was not, as it turns out, worthy of our feelings of love or affection could be 
taken as signalling that they failed to meet the correctness conditions set by our feelings 
toward them – they were represented as being some evaluative way, and yet they turned 
out not to be that way. So, the relevant epistemic constraint need not be over-demanding 
– rather, it accords with a feature of our folk discourse about such cases.  
Summing up, the propositionalist has substantive responses to the OT in the 
candidate case of occurrent feelings of love. It is arguably a necessary condition on having 
an emotional experience of love – that is occurrently being in the loving (or hating) 
emotional attitude towards a person – that the relevant experience represents that person 
as of value. The responses considered are strategies intended to support this position, 
which the propositionalist can use in arguing against the OT in general. While to 
definitively rule out the OT we would have to proceed case-by-case, there is good reason 
for supposing that propositionalism about emotional content (on a WPC view) can 
defend itself against the OT. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has made the positive case for applying a WPC view of propositional content 
to emotional experience. As noted at the outset, propositionalism about emotional 
content is tentative; it only takes one convincing case of an emotional experience that 
has non-propositional content to undermine the view. However, on a WPC view, this 
will not be an easy task for the non-propositionalist. As such, until we have convincing 
examples of purely-objectual emotional experiences, we have reason to suppose that the 
content of emotional experience is a kind of propositional content. 
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